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Abstract: Grid computing systems are complex and dynamic environments requiring appropriate automated 
management mechanisms, which would enable stable and reliable operation of the whole grid ecosystem. 
Moreover, the recent novel concept of mobile grid computing – a combination of grid systems with mobile 
devices – also requires new ways of monitoring the emerging security aspects, associated with the ever-
increasing role of network connections in mobile grids. Existing grid monitoring systems, albeit suitable for 
traditional, localised grid systems, seem to be ignoring the security dimension and do not offer appropriate 
support for enforcing security policies within a distributed grid system enhanced with mobile devices. 
Accordingly, in this paper we present the Grid Security Policy Monitoring System (GridSPMS) – a novel grid 
monitoring framework, which extends the traditional support for data monitoring (i.e., tools, protocols, etc.) 
with mechanisms for collecting run-time data within grids, focussing on the security dimension. By doing so, 
GridSPMS aims at monitoring the activity within a grid system and detect situations, where security policies 
have been potentially violated and, therefore, appropriate response actions have to be taken in this respect. 
Accordingly, GridSPMS has the potential to address security threats existing in the domain of mobile grid 
computing, and enable grid administrators with support for timely detection of and response to security-
related incidents. 
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1. Introduction 
With the emergence and the rapid development of cloud computing in the last decade, grid computing is 
nowadays mainly used in the context of academic research with little (or no) interest and support from the 
industry. Essentially, grids have hardly been seen as a commercial product to be offered to a wide range of 
customers (Foster et al., 2008). As opposed to cloud computing, which is widely known to be a highly 
commercialised and industry-driven research area, grid computing is becoming to attract less and less attention 
of the research community. 
The situation, however, might change with the recent introduction of mobile grids. Mobile grid computing is an 
emerging computing paradigm, which lies at the intersection of two research areas – namely, grid computing 
and mobile computing (Litke et al., 2004). It can be seen as a re-incarnation of conventional grid systems, and its 
main concept is to extend the traditional capabilities of grids – that is, provisioning of a large pool of aggregated 
computational and storage resources in order to address computationally-intensive tasks (Foster and 
Kesselman, 1999) – with computational capabilities of mobile devices provisioned over the network. Broadly 
speaking a mobile grid can be defined as a complex scalable distributed system involving a variety of nodes 
some of which might be mobile, geographically distributed around the globe and using various communication 
protocols. From this perspective, mobile grid computing can be seen as an evolution of the concept of grids 
from traditional, in-premises deployments to a distributed computer architecture, consisting of both server 
clusters residing in a data centre and multiple mobile devices, such as smartphones, tablets and laptops, 
connected to the main cluster via a wireless network. 
What was regarded as impractical and impossible just several years ago, today is attracting more and more 
investigation both from industry and academia. Indeed, portable mobile devices are becoming more and 
powerful in terms of their CPU and memory capabilities, and the bandwidth of 5G mobile networks is 
approaching 1GB per second. In this light, the potential integration of grids with mobile computing is becoming 
even more promising. The inherent benefit of mobile grid computing is that it allows users to access grid 
resources from a mobile device from virtually anywhere at any time, without the requirement to be sitting next 
to a terminal. Moreover, in mobile grid architectures, mobile devices are expected to act not just as resource 
 
 
consumers, accessing grid resources, but also act and as resource providers in their own right, contributing to 
the shared pool of available resources (Katsaros and Polyzos, 2008). This latter feature may enable forming of 
‘ad-hoc’ mobile grid compositions on the spot. In other words, it is possible to create local, short-term mobile 
grids at various venues and locations with an increased concentration of smart mobile devices, such as, for 
example, conferences and universities (Litke et al., 2004). 
Along with these promising opportunities for increased computational capabilities and ubiquitous network 
access to computational and storage resources, come emerging challenges so as to how to manage these 
resulting complex environments and maintain stable quality of service (QoS). The issue of delivering promised 
QoS to mobile grid users is multi-faceted, and can be seen from several perspectives. In the first instance, QoS 
depends on the networking capabilities of a mobile grid system. Mobile network bandwidth remains the main 
factor to guarantee smooth and undisrupted data exchange between mobile devices and grid servers. Another 
important concern in satisfying QoS requirements is the implementation of the resource management 
mechanism responsible for resource discovery and selection, job scheduling and replication, data migration and 
monitoring (Bichhawat and Joshi, 2010). In the presence of a considerably higher number of computational 
nodes constituting the mobile grid system, it is important to organise how various computational tasks are split, 
scheduled and executed in an efficient and scalable manner. 
The last but not the least, the emergence of mobile grid computing poses new challenges as to how these 
distributed systems should be properly protected and secured. As opposed to traditional grid architectures, 
where networking is not regarded as one of the primary issues to take into account, in mobile grids the 
networking dimension plays a dominant role. The wireless nature of network connections introduces new 
threats and makes resulting mobile grid systems vulnerable to a wide range of threats such as eavesdropping, 
data tampering and data tracing (Bichhawat and Joshi, 2010). Accordingly, novel appropriate monitoring and 
detection mechanisms are required in order to address these security issues and enable mobile grid systems 
with sufficient self-protective capabilities to maintain required QoS and at the same time provide sufficient 
scalability – a key feature of mobile grids. 
Given these considerations, in this paper we argue that a potential way of supporting security management in 
mobile grid computing is to monitor grid activities with a goal to detect and report security-related incidents, 
followed by a generation of an effective security incident response plan. Accordingly, we also present and 
explain our own Grid Security Policy Monitoring System (GridSPMS), which is a framework to monitor security 
policy compliance in grids, detect potential violations, and report on the detected incidents. We provide a high-
level architecture of the framework and discuss its potential benefits and limitations. 
Accordingly, the rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section II introduces and briefs the reader on the 
security issue in grid computing in general and in mobile grids in particular. The section also provides a state-of-
the-art overview in the considered research area and identifies existing limitations and gaps. To address the 
identified gaps, Section III presents our proposed GridSPMS and describes its conceptual architecture in a top-
down manner – a conceptual architecture is followed by a more fin-grained description of individual 
components. Section IV contains some concluding remarks and summarises this paper. 
2. Motivation: Insufficient Security in Mobile Grids 
Arguably, security (albeit a major research challenge in IT in general) has never been one of the primary 
concerns in grids. Historically, grids have been associated with relatively small-scale, localised deployments 
within a single data centre (Bessis et al., 2010), where number of network connections was limited and stable. 
Also, they have been primarily serving scientific purposes, and therefore the number of users accessing grid 
resources was typically limited and could be easily controlled, and, therefore, there was no real pressing 
demand for enforcing various security checks. Moreover, grids have not been seen as a commercial product to 
be offered to a wide range of customers (Foster et al., 2008), and, consequently, there was relatively little 
interest and support from the industry. As a result, development of grids, including investigation of security-
related issues, has been primarily driven by academic researchers. 
For example, Foster et al. (Foster et al., 1998) were among the first to realise and address the challenge of 
delivering security in grid systems. The authors proposed and implemented an architecture for secure grids. 
This work established theoretical and practical foundations for designing and implementing grid environments 
in a secure, robust and reliable manner, and the proposed architecture has become a reference model for 
other approaches aiming to achieve high levels of security in grids. 
However, implementing grid systems in a secure manner following the proposed reference architecture on its 
own is not enough. An inherent requirement to achieve sufficient levels of security in grids (and in computing 
 
 
systems in general) is to implement appropriate monitoring mechanisms, which would enable prompt and 
timely detection of potential violations. Such monitoring mechanisms would collect various security-related 
data within grids, analyse with respect to a set of security policies, and detect if there any violations calling for 
immediate responsive action from the human administrator – taken together, we refer to these processes as 
security policy monitoring. 
This latter requirement of implementing security policy monitoring mechanisms, however, has been (and still 
is) beyond the common capabilities of existing grid monitoring systems. As indicated by our recent survey 
(Suwan et al., 2016), existing grid monitoring frameworks seem to neglect the security dimension. Their 
capabilities to be extended so as to integrate security-related monitoring metrics and policies are also limited 
This is becoming a particularly pressing challenge with the rapid development of mobile technologies and the 
emergence of mobile grid computing, which can be seen as part of the global paradigm shift in IT. From 
personal desktop computers we are moving towards portable mobile computing, supported by the powers of 
clouds. In 2011, smartphone sales exceeded PC sales for the first time in the history (Cocotas, 2012), and as it 
was recently declared by Apple CEO Tim Cook, the PC is now officially dead (Ghosal, 2015). Admittedly, with 
this mobile revolution the mobile security issue has been attracting much attention. The market of portable 
and mobile devices would not be exponentially growing if it was not properly supported by advances in 
security and data protection. Accordingly, as the mobile technology was advancing and the number of mobile 
devices was growing, the research and industrial community has been consequently putting more and more 
efforts into investigating possible approaches to provide efficient and secure solutions for mobile platforms. In 
the 1990s the mobile technology was in its infancy and security issues were among the minor concerns with 
little or attention. Then, in the 2000s, the community focused on enabling mobile platforms with reactive self-
protective mechanisms, which would fix potential harmful consequences of detected malware. And now we 
are seeing how more and more proactive mechanisms are attempting to predict and prevent possible attacks 
and threats before they even happen. 
These advances in mobile security, however, have not been yet applied to the domain of mobile grid 
computing, and in the next section of this paper we are presenting Grid Security Policy Monitoring System 
(GridSPMS) – our own attempt to create a grid monitoring framework fully supporting the security dimension. 
3. GridSPMS: Conceptual Architecture 
In order to address the identified gaps in the domain of mobile grid security, we are currently developing our 
own Grid Security Policy Monitoring System (GridSPMS). This system is built on top of an already existing grid 
monitoring framework Ganglia1 and extends its functionality with the support for the security dimension. 
Before presenting the actual design and architecture of GridSPMS, we first outline a (non-exhaustive) list of 
desired important features, which were taken into consideration and influenced the design of the final system. 
These desired features, which concern both functional and non-functional properties, include: 
 Support for monitoring and enforcing security policies is a fundamental feature of the envisaged 
monitoring framework. In a broad sense, a security policy is a rule which defines and enforces certain 
constraints on grid resources. For instance, security policies can be applied to limit access to memory 
and CPU resources per user, restrict from creating excessive jobs, etc. Typically, security policies may 
target either individual users, or whole user groups (i.e., user roles). 
 Support for security incident response policies is another key feature of the proposed grid monitoring 
framework. Security incident response policies describe reactive actions which need to be taken 
whenever a security policy is violated – that is, whenever a security incident takes place. In the 
context of grids, an example of a security incident may be unauthorised access to computational 
resources, excessive consumption of resources, accessing resources using an insecure network 
connection, etc. Accordingly, security incident response policies may define reactive actions ranging 
from simple reporting to the human administrator to more sophisticated actions such as 
automatically applying appropriate actions to bring the system back to the initial stable state. The 
former is typically referred to as a passive response, and the latter is known as an active response. 
                                                                
1 Ganglia is a scalable distributed monitoring system for high-performance computing systems such as clusters 
and grids (http://ganglia.sourceforge.net/). 
 
 
 Ability to seamlessly integrate with Ganglia refers to our intention to re-use the positive experience of 
an already existing and efficient grid monitoring framework without ‘re-inventing the wheel’. In a 
sense, we intend to develop a fully compatible extension to the core Ganglia functionality, which will 
be able to benefit from data collected and supplied by Ganglia to offer additional security-related 
capabilities. 
 Ease of deployment is a requirement closely related to and stemming from the previous one. 
Inheriting Ganglia’s functionality, the proposed monitoring system is expected to remain easily 
deployable and configurable within grid environments. 
 Information abstraction means that the monitoring system is able to integrate, synthesise and 
interpret collected information so that only relevant is displayed to the user. Additionally, users are 
not supposed to interact with the back-end mechanism, which will be transparently abstracted by the 
front-end interface (i.e., web browser). 
 Dynamic information retrieval and near real-time operation are two features, which refer to the 
system requirement to function in a timely manner. Data, collected by the GridSPMS, is highly 
dynamic in its very nature, and the system has to be properly equipped so as to collect and process 
this data with minimum delay. This in turn will facilitate prompt detection of potentially critical 
situations and timely reporting on security incidents. In such data-intensive environments as (mobile) 
grids where observed values may become obsolete and outdates within seconds, these requirements 
are seen as one of the primary challenges. 
 Uniform data representation is expected to overcome existing heterogeneity in data representation 
formats. There has to be a common vocabulary of terms – that is, a standard way of representing 
information in the context of managed grid environments, which may include, for example, various 
grid components, system users, geo- location, historical values, security incidents, etc. 
 Support for scalability is an inherent requirement of the grid domain, which is characterised with a 
highly distributed environment, consisting of a large number of computational nodes and clusters. 
With the introduction of mobile grids, this challenge is taken to a completely new level, where data 
has to be collected from multiple remote mobile nodes over the network. The envisaged monitoring 
framework is expected to support integration of newly-added nodes in an automated manner, so that 
changes are immediately reflected in the system in a transparent and seamless manner. 
 High performance and robustness can be seen as pre-requisites to enable scalability in GridSPMS, 
which should take into account the demands of a distributed environment to enable failure-free 
execution. This also implies that grid elements (i.e., individual nodes or whole clusters), which are 
currently unavailable, crashed or under-performing entities should be safely isolated from the 
‘healthy’ grid to support the stability of the whole grid ecosystem. 
 Ubiquitous remote access over the Internet is another inherent requirement of mobile grids. With the 
integration of portable mobile devices into the grids, it is also essential to enable remote access to the 
presentation layer of the monitoring system via some kind of a ‘mission control’. In other words, a 
user is expected to remotely access and see the grid monitoring dashboard from any remotely-
located device at any time. Apart from viewing the current status of the monitored grid system, the 
user is also supposed to be able to manage and control the system. 
3.1 Four-layered conceptual architecture of GridSPMS 
We now proceed describing the actual architecture of the proposed monitoring system in a top-down manner. 
First, we present a high-level conceptual overview of GridSPMS, consisting of four layers, and then go into 
more details by explaining individual components constituting the system. 
Figure 1 schematically depicts the proposed four-layer architecture of the GridSPMS. These conceptual layers 
are interdependent, so that upper layers build upon and rely on the lower layers. Such organisation also 
reflects the established structure of modern grid systems, where low-level monitored data is first collected 
from individual nodes, and then proceeds through a series of abstractions to represent an aggregated and 
synthesised view on a cluster of nodes, and, finally, on the whole grid. This approach represents the grid as a 
hierarchical network of clusters and nodes and facilitates scalability. Accordingly, the information flow can be 
represented by the following triple: 
 
 
Node → Cluster → Grid 




Figure 1: Four-layered architecture of GridSPMS. 
 Resources layer represents monitored resources (such as individual nodes, network connections, 
storage devices, etc.), equipped with a Ganglia agent to collect relevant data. Monitored metrics 
typically include the general availability of a particular resource, as well as CPU and memory 
utilisation, network statistics, occupied storage space, etc. 
 Middleware layer represents the Ganglia framework, which is responsible for a wide range of 
activities, such as resource management and grid monitoring (which is the most important feature in 
the context of the presented research). Ganglia’s monitoring depends on daemon processes called 
gmetad or gmond, which serve to collect data about grid nodes. Ganglia monitoring capabilities can 
be extended with the Ganglia metric tool (gmetric) which enables monitoring of arbitrary host metrics 
by expanding the core set of metrics measure by gmond by default. Simply put, users can develop 
their own metrics and deploy them into the monitored grid system to extend the basic monitoring 
capabilities. Another important component is the Job Submission Handler, which is responsible for 
resource management and job scheduling. This component is capable of checking whether resources 
are available and users are authorised to access them. Together with the other standard metrics and 
extended custom metrics, it is possible to extract statistical data per user (i.e., number of allocated 
nodes, CPU/memory usage, network traffic, user IP address, etc.) from job submission handler and 
deliver them to Ganglia in an adapted format. 
 Integration layer is where GridSPMS is located. Our proposed system receives relevant data from 
Ganglia and implements mechanisms for detecting a security incident and consequent responding to 
it. GridSPMS consists of four main components – namely, Data Collection, Breach Detection Engine 
(BDE), Security Policy Database (SPD) and Incident Response Module (IRM) – which will be further 
described in the next section. 
 Client application layer represents interfaces through which GridSPMS users can interact with the 
system. These include an Application Programmable Interface (API), Command Line Interface (CLI), 
and Web-based Graphical User Interface (GUI). These interfaces are intended to enable users to 
interact with the system and, if necessary, extend its functionality and integrate in their own software 
systems (e.g., in science, finances, engineering applications). 
 
 
3.2 GridSPMS components 
Having presented a high-level overview of GridSPMS, we now proceed with a more detailed description of its 
internal organisation and its individual components.  
As it was previously explained, GridSPMS is built on top of Ganglia, which provides the basic tools for resource 
monitoring in computational grids. From this perspective, it can be seen as an extension to Ganglia, which 
complements the existing functionality with the support for the security dimension. The diagram in Figure 2 
schematically depicts the main components of GridSPMS and their interaction between each other. We 
distinguish between 12 main components, which we now consider one by one in more details. 
It is worth mentioning that the presented component architecture has been inspired by the Common 
Component Architecture (CCA) (Armstrong et al., 1999) – a reference model which defines how complex 
computing systems have to be designed and implemented in a modular manner. This architecture has been 
widely used in the design of cluster and grid systems, where individual components are seen as basic building 
blocks used to construct a complex system. 
 
Figure 1: Components constituting GridSMPS at various layers. 
 Resource manager/Scheduler is part of the core functionality of contemporary grid platforms, which is 
responsible for i) receiving task requirements from the user, ii) allocating and provisioning 
appropriate resources to the user, iii) scheduling application jobs and optimising resource utilisation, 
and iv) monitoring job execution processes. All these activities take place provided the user is 
authorised to access and use corresponding grid resources. 
 Pre-processor is responsible for collecting user statistical data like jobs, allocated nodes, CPU/memory 
utilisation, as well as user IP addresses, which helps to determine user’s geographical location. Pre-
processor is also responsible for sending the input information to Ganglia via gmetric tool. 
 Ganglia typically includes one or more instances of gmetad daemon processes, which are responsible 
for collecting data about managed grid clusters or nodes. The server running a gmetad daemon 
process constantly sends XML packets over the TCP connection. These packets contain information 
about the current state of individual nodes and clusters within grids. Depending on the types of 
gmond or gmetad daemon processes, which are responsible for the actual extraction of data, the XML 
 
 
data includes various fields related to the actual performance of a particular node or cluster and 
behaviour of the users. Ganglia is also designed to be extensible so that users are also free to develop 
and integrate their own extension to the core system – a feature which proved to be helpful in the 
context of our own research. Accordingly, we are also able to extract and send user geo-location data 
as an XML packet. 
 Data collector is a component, which periodically polls and receives XML packets sent over the 
network from Ganglia and parses this information. Depending on the predefined rules it filters, and 
aggregates the obtained information and persists into the Grid database. At this stage, security 
concerns are becoming to play an important role, as data collector is now specifically looks at the data 
related to potential security policy breaches. In this sense, it can be seen as a mediator between the 
core Ganglia component and GridSPMS. 
 Grid database is a usual relational database MySQL, which are responsible for storing data received 
by the data collector from Ganglia. The persisted data is then available to other components of 
GridSPMS (i.e., BDE and ACME) and perform administrative tasks via the standard SQL queries. 
 Breach detection engine (BDE) is a core analysis component of GridSPMS, which queries data from 
the database and matches it against a set of pre-defined security policies with a goal to detect 
potential security breaches. Situations where the collected data fails to satisfy the policy constraints 
are classified as security breaches, and a corresponding security incident has to be reported and/or 
corresponding response actions have to be taken. 
 Security policy database serves to store rules, regulating the security-related activities within the grid 
system and used by BDE. We assume that security policies are designed and implemented by policy 
managers – human administrators and domain specialists, who also act as supervisors when 
responses to incidents are reported (i.e., passive responses) and executed (i.e., active responses).  
 Incident response module serves to report, manage and document all detected grid security incidents. 
In case of emergency (i.e., a security breach is detected), the incident response module will first notify 
the human administrator and/or may take certain actions in a more autonomic manner. 
 Violation reporting component is a simple module, whose only responsibility is to notify the human 
administrator of the detected security breach via one of the available communication channels (e.g., 
an e-mail, a sound signal, a pop-up window in the administration panel). A notification message 
contains information about the violation, including detection time, potential cause of violation, and a 
user associated with the incident.  
 Access control monitoring engine (ACME) is a component responsible for collecting data, which 
concerns accessing the system. It constantly monitors user activity, such as login attempts, user 
locations and IP addresses, managing user accounts and access rights, etc. 
 Grid activity log is a component, where all the activities taking place within the managed grid 
environment are recorded and stored. The storage period may range from few days to several years, 
depending on the requirements. 
4. Conclusion 
As we have claimed, grid computing systems are complex and dynamic environments requiring appropriate 
automated management mechanisms, which would enable stable and reliable operation of the whole grid 
ecosystem. The research community has addressed this requirement with a number of monitoring 
frameworks, which serve to collect data at various levels to support decision taking and management activities 
within grids. However, these existing solutions seem to implement little support for collecting security-related 
data and enforcing appropriate security policies and constraints in this respect. With the emergence of mobile 
grid computing, an increasing role of network connections, and a growing number of users remotely accessing 
computational resources from various locations, grid systems are no longer seen as localised and isolated 
ecosystems, but are coming to be more open and distributed. In this light, it is becoming more and more 
important to enable monitoring framework with capabilities to collect security-related data and check whether 
these observations comply with certain security constraints – that is, to monitor security policies in grids. 
Accordingly, in this paper, we presented our work in progress, which aims at creating an efficient solution for 
enabling monitoring the security dimension in grid systems. The proposed GridSPMS is an extension to Ganglia 
 
 
and attempts to build on its already existing and efficient capabilities for monitoring various types of data 
within grids to additionally enable capturing some security-related metrics and match them against a set of 
security policies. 
We have described the proposed architecture in a top-down fashion, starting from a high-level overview of 
four main levels constituting GridSPMS. Then, we focused on the actual internal organisation and presented its 
main functional components. More specifically, we explained how the core functionality of Ganglia could be 
extended so as to incorporate collecting security-related data (e.g., user geo-location) to support compliance 
checking against a set of security policies. The resulting system is expected to be capable to detect and report 
on various security-related accidents – an increasingly important feature in the context of emerging mobile 
grids. 
At the moment, the presented paper describes our work in progress, which has been primarily focussing on 
developing the architectural design of GridSPMS. As a next step we are considering implementing a prototype 
version of the proposed system, integrating it with Ganglia and validating in an existing grid environment. 
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